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Abstract 
Market access/potential are main explanations for spatial variation in economic 
activity. Past research has recently used the quasi-natural experiment of the imposition 
and removal of Iron Curtain to assess how changes in market access influenced 
economic outcomes. Rather, we focus on key quantity effects of market access by 
tracking population changes induced by the creation of a subnational border. We 
exploit a quasi-natural experiment in China and use a difference-in-difference 
identification strategy to estimate the effects of introducing a new border when 
Sichuan province was split into Chongqing and Sichuan in 1997. We find that the new 
border has negative population effects on Sichuan counties located near the new 
border. These counties experienced a substantial decline in population growth after 
1997 compared to Sichuan counties farther from the border, with the negative effects 
mainly confined to a band within 50-100 kilometers to the new border. Further 
investigation with falsification tests found that such border effects are unique to the 
new border region and are not related to the new Sichuan border region being more 
rural or to being on any provincial border. 
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1. Introduction 
Border effects have long interested international economists examining the validity of 
the “law of one price.” In the case of regional and urban economists, the interest in 
border effects is more recent and regards how transactions costs due to a border may 
affect agglomeration economies, and in turn market potential/access. Models 
including the New Economic Geography posit that greater market access is a key 
feature in the development of the urban hierarchy. Moreover, market access/potential 
are key explanations for spatial variation in economy activity (e.g., Krugman 1991; 
Hanson 1996).  
There is a large empirical literature assessing the quantity effects of home-market 
and market access on regional economies. Redding and Sturm (2008), among others, 
investigate population changes in cities located near the border between East and 
West Germany after the country’s division in the wake of the Second World War and 
reunification in 1990. Brakman et al. (2012) test whether border cities or regions are 
more affected by EU integration than more core-central locations given that border 
regions may be more dramatically influenced by the changes of market potential. In 
similar analysis, Partridge et al. (2008) find that proximity to cities in the urban 
hierarchy is more important than simple market access in driving population growth 
across U.S. counties. Faber (2014) and Baum-Snow et al. (2016) assess how highway 
construction in China has affected local industrial output by reducing transport costs 
and increasing market size. Similarly, Percoco (2016) examines the effects of highway 
on employment and the number of plants in Italy.  
Hanson (1997) and Redding and Venables (2004) address price effects, finding 
that market access is positively associated with wages and income per capita, whereas 
Fallah et al. (2011) report that market access is positively linked to income inequality. 
Partridge et al. (2009) show that U.S. county wages and housing values are unaffected 
by market access, however they are strongly affected by proximity to varying sized 
cities in the urban hierarchy. Brülhart et al. (2012) study both regional-employment 
and nominal-wages responses in Austria after the opening of Western and Central 
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European markets after the Iron Curtain fell. They find that places closer to the former 
Iron Curtain benefit more from increases in market potential.  
 In this paper, we focus on the quantity effects of market access. We exploit a 
quasi-natural experiment in China and use a difference-in-difference identification 
strategy to estimate the effects of introducing a new border when Sichuan province 
was split into Chongqing and Sichuan in 1997. Following the New Economic 
Geography and agglomeration literatures, when Chongqing was separated from 
Sichuan, there was a decrease in market access for Sichuan counties close to the new 
border (assuming border-effect costs, which we describe below). In addition, given 
that Chongqing was the region’s main urban center, moving it into a new province 
upset the economic dynamics of nearby Sichuan counties. With this approach, we 
control for common shocks and isolate the effects of the new border by examining 
pre- and post-1997 population growth in Sichuan counties close to the border 
compared to those in its interior.  
 Our central contribution is that we assess border effects for a different type of 
border – establishment of a provincial subnational border – and to another continent 
with considerably different historical and institutional circumstances than the 
imposition and removal of Iron Curtain in Europe as in Redding and Sturm (2008) 
and Brülhart et al. (2012). Our estimates suggest that the new border between 
Chongqing and Sichuan has negative population effects on Sichuan counties located 
near the border. These counties experienced a substantial decline in population growth 
after 1997 compared to counties more remote from the border. The negative border 
effects are mainly confined to a band within 50 to 100 kilometers to the border.  
In falsification tests, we find that other Sichuan regions near other neighboring 
provincial borders do not experience such negative effects, supporting our conclusion 
that it is the new border that is causing the outflow of population. Similarly, 
descriptive evidence also found that border regions in other provinces adjacent to the 
new Chongqing province also experienced slower growth, though not as negative as 
the Sichuan border region.  Likewise, we find that it is not rural regions in general 
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that experienced population outflows.  
Along with using resident population to assess the border effects, we also test 
whether the new border affects Hukou population. These results show that the new 
border does not have significant effects on Hukou population in the border region 
compared with other Sichuan regions. This suggests that many of the original Hukou 
residents near the border left to work elsewhere after 1997. 
 Clearly, such border effects only exist when there are transaction costs for 
cross-border trade and movement of factors of production.1 Thus, we also contribute 
to the literature on China’s domestic market integration. Poncet (2003, 2005) studies 
the degree of domestic market in China by examining trade flows, finding large 
provincial border effects during the 1990s. Xu and Fan (2012) use a gravity model 
and input-output data to find further evidence of provincial border effects in China, 
but they are smaller than suggested by Poncet. Indeed, there are reasons to expect that 
there are provincial border effects due to factors such as the Hukou system, local 
competition and protectionism, differing provincial tax practices and regulations, as 
well as other features such as state owned enterprises. Our results suggest that the new 
border matters for regional development, but after there is a new equilibrium, 
population growth near provincial borders may revert to their prior equilibrium trend 
of growth rate. However, it is the level of resident population that is lower than what it 
would have otherwise been.  
  
2. Background on the New Border  
Why was Chongqing separated from Sichuan province to become an independent 
provincial city in the mid 1990s?2 There are at least three explanations.3 First, 
Chinese disparities between the inland and coastal regions deepened during the 1990s 
                                                             
1In the international trade literature, there is a related border effects literature investigating whether differences in 
transactions costs at the border overturn the “law of one price” (Engel and Rogers, 1996; Anderson and van 
Wincoop, 2003; Boivin et al., 2012; Anderson et al., 2016). For example, despite many similarities, there appears 
to be rather large border effects between the U.S. and Canada. While our work is on the same border-effects topic, 
it relates to a different question of agglomeration and market-access effects. 
2There are four provincial cities in China. Besides Chongqing, the others are Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin.  
3See Pu (2009) for more information on the separation of Chongqing from Sichuan told by the first Major of 
Chongqing after Chongqing was separated from Sichuan.  
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after nearly 20 years of rapid economic growth.4 It was thought that Chongqing, as 
one of the largest inland industrial cities, had to change its governance in order to 
catch up with coastal growth. Second, Sichuan’s population had already exceeded 100 
million before 1996 and there were 221 county-level administration units in the 
province. The high administrative costs from having so many administrative units and 
a large population induced the central government to consider disaggregating Sichuan 
province. Third, there were large labor demands for constructing the Three Gorges 
Dam, as well as migration for those displaced by the project.5 It was viewed that one 
approach to manage the large migration flows was to change the administrative 
boundaries. Given that Chongqing is the largest city in southwestern China and in the 
upper and middle reaches of Yangtze River, it acts as transportation center of these 
regions. Thus, the central government separated Chongqing from Sichuan province to 
become an independent provincial city in 1997.  
 We treat the separation of Chongqing as a quasi-natural experiment. We argue 
that placing the new border between Chongqing and Sichuan was an unexpected 
exogenous change. While the separation of Chongqing had been discussed before 
1997, the exact border was not publicized before the central government approved the 
division on March 14, 1997. In fact, the central government considered four different 
plans to divide Sichuan and it was unclear which plan would be implemented until the 
central government’s final decision. Though Chongqing was separated from Sichuan, 
note that Sichuan province still included Chengdu, which is also one of China’s major 
cities, but is not nearly as large as Chongqing.   
 Economic growth in Chongqing accelerated after 1997, though it initially lagged 
in population growth after the division. Its average GDP growth rate has been above 
10% in the past 20 years. In fact, Chongqing’s recent growth has been among the 
highest across all provinces since China entered the “New Normal Era.”6 In order to 
                                                             
4For recent discussion on regional disparities in China, see Chen and Groenewold (2013, 2014), Herrerias and 
Monford (2015), and Li et al. (2017). 
5The Three Gorges Dam is the main project for constructing the largest hydroelectricity plant in the world. 
Construction started in 1994 and ended in 2006. For more information about the Three Gorges Dam, see Jackson 
and Sleigh (2001). 
6China’s economic growth has slowed since 2012 with President Jinping Xi stating that China’s economy had 
entered into a “New Normal” in 2014. See Huang et al.(2013), Cai and Roberts (2015) and Lin et al.(2016) for 
 
 
6 
 
examine the effect of the new Chongqing-Sichuan border on regional development, 
we calculate the growth rate of resident population between 1982 and 1990 (before 
the new border) and that between 2000 and 2010 (after the new border) in counties of 
Sichuan province after controlling for other factors that may affect county growth.7 
We report these population growth rates in Figure 1 and 2. Due to data constraints, our 
empirical analysis will focus on the Sichuan side of the border because Chongqing’s 
counties were completely redefined after the separation, making direct before- and 
after-comparisons impossible—e.g., there were approximately 10 Chongqing counties 
within 50 kilometers of the new border pre-1997 and roughly 32 thereafter. Yet, this 
follows similar analysis by Redding and Sturm’s focus on Western Germany (2008) 
and Brülhart et al.’s (2012) assessment of Austria.  
The theoretical predictions are quite clear as to how Sichuan’s new border 
counties should suffer with the border’s introduction due to higher “costs” to reach 
Chongqing’s markets. Conversely, for Chongqing’s “new” border counties, it is a 
priori unclear what would happen. Namely, these new Chongqing border counties 
also lose market access in Sichuan after the border is established, but this is offset 
because they still have close access to Chongqing (and Chongqing’s economy may 
gain due to improved governance), while losing some competition from nearby 
Sichuan counties.   
Figure 1 and 2 about here 
To assess this issue, Figure 1 indicates that 1982-1990 Sichuan population growth 
varied along the future Sichuan-Chongqing border with both high and low rates of 
population growth. During the 2000-2010 period (Figure 2), counties with low growth 
rates appear to be concentrated along the new border, while growth appears to be 
faster in the interior of Sichuan province. Together, the two maps suggest that Sichuan 
counties along the new Sichuan-Chongqing border suffered. The difference in 
population growth rates between the two periods (Figure 3) reinforces the notion that 
                                                                                                                                                                              
more discussion of the New Normal and the slower growth in China. 
7We use population census data which are conducted once every ten years. We will mainly focus on the regional 
effects in Sichuan province in this paper given data constraints. See more discussion on this in next section. 
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counties closer to the border had less population growth in the first decade of 21st 
century.  
Figure 3 about here 
It is useful, therefore, to first explore whether the new border regions experienced 
different outcomes with Chongqing province’s creation. Thus, for various periods, 
Table 1 reports the growth rates for 0 to 50, 50-100, and greater than 50 kilometers 
from (1) the respective border for the new Sichuan border counties (along Chongqing); 
(2) for Chongqing’s border regions; and (3) the Hubei, Hunan, Guizhou, and Shaanxi 
provincial border regions along the new Chongqing province. To make comparisons, 
we also report the difference in growth rates between less than 50 and more than 50 
kilometers from the respective border. Growth rates for 50-100 kilometers from the 
border are also shown to illustrate if the whether any effects extend beyond 50 
kilometers. The selected periods are 1982-1990 (pre-division decade), the 1990-2000 
decade when the division took place (which would have a mixture of offsetting 
effects), and the 2000-2010 decade that should more clearly reflect the effects of the 
division given the sufficient passage of time. 
Table 1 about here 
Between 1982-1990, total population in Sichuan counties within 50kms of the 
new border grew 7.9% but lost 14.6% population between 2000-2010, while their 
Chongqing counterparts respectively gained 5.5% and lost 13.4% population during 
the two periods. Thus, population growth rate for Sichuan counties along the border 
declined by about 22.5% during the period versus a decline of only 18.9% for 
corresponding Chongqing border areas—consistent with the new border isolating 
these Sichuan border areas from Chongqing. However, the relative decline in 
Chongqing border counties also suggests they have experienced adverse effects from 
the creation of the new border. 
In addition, when considering the difference between growth for Sichuan counties 
greater than 50 kilometers to those less than 50 kilometers, in the 1980s, growth was 
about 1.2% greater in what would become the new border region. Yet, this advantage 
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for Sichuan border regions did not extend into the 1990s with “interior” regions 
growing 3.3% faster, rising to a 17.4% advantage in the 2000-2010 decade. While not 
directly comparable due to boundary changes, Chongqing counties within 50 
kilometers of the new border also suffered a relative decline in growth rates. In the 
1980s and 1990s, “interior” regions were growing just over 1% faster than what 
became counties that border Sichuan. However, the gap increased to nearly 7% in the 
latter period. Thus, the results are consistent with the prediction that border regions on 
both sides fare worse with the creation of the border. 
The other four provinces that border the new Chongqing province would likely be 
negatively affected by border effects, which may be offset by Chongqing’s net 
economic performance after the division (given that Chongqing could have been 
negatively or positively affected). For example, they may lose some access to 
traditional Sichuan markets. The results suggest that for these four provinces, their 
Chongqing-province border regions had an average growth rate that was greater than 
elsewhere in these four provinces during the 1980s and 1990s. However, this 
drastically changed in the 2000-2010 decade when the Chongqing border regions in 
these four provinces lagged by about 6.5%, similar to the results for Sichuan and 
Chongqing. Thus, the consistent story is that areas along the new Chongqing border 
experienced the predicted relative population decline after the border’s establishment. 
Figure 4 about here 
We now assess whether the creation of Chongqing province had beneficial effects 
on its growth. As noted above, Chongqing was Sichuan province’s economic engine 
prior to the division but afterwards, Chengdu became Sichuan province’s engine. To 
assess whether Chongqing’s relative performance improved after the division due to 
improved governance factors, Figure 4 compares resident population in Chengdu to 
Chongqing over the 1990-2010 period. The graphs clearly show that while Chongqing 
is generally larger than Chengdu, its growth trends diverge around the division point 
in 1997. Chengdu’s population continued to expand while Chongqing’s population 
declined after 1997 before exploding after 2004. Thus, this pattern is supportive of the 
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notion that the dominant factor, at least initially after the division, was a decline in 
market access hurting Chongqing and border regions to the new province, while 
economic growth shifted to the interior of Sichuan province with Chengdu becoming 
more prominent. 
 
3. Estimation Strategy and Data  
Our theoretical expectations of the effects of the new border can be formally derived 
in models proposed by Redding and Sturm (2008), Hering and Poncet (2010), and 
Brülhart et al. (2012). Interested readers can consult those papers. We also use an 
empirical approach similar to Redding and Sturm (2008) and Brülhart et al. (2012), 
though with some added changes to reflect our specific setting. For the 1982-1990 and 
2000-2010 periods, we regress population growth in Sichuan counties (PopGrow) on 
a dummy for border regions (Border) and a dummy that is equal to one for years after 
1997 (Post1997), and their interaction, as well as a set of control variables (X). Our 
primary estimation equation is the following:  
 
( * 1997 ) 1997it i t i t it itPopGrow Border Post Border Post X e            (1) 
 
where is the coefficient of interest that measures how population in the new Sichuan 
border regions (the treated group) evolves differently than other Sichuan regions (the 
control group) after the border was implemented in 1997. The use of 1982-1990 has 
the advantage of being far enough prior to the new border to rule out anticipation 
effects while the latter period is far enough after the new border was introduced to 
allow for migration to begin. As noted, beyond the descriptive analysis above, we are 
unable to do the same on the Chongqing side of the border because the redefinition of 
counties makes this impossible.  
We include multiple geographic and regional variables as controls to account for 
a host of various alternative hypotheses for differing growth rates. First are three 
distance variables Dis_Chengdu, Dis_Chongqing and Dis_SC_Border, which measure 
the distance from each county in Sichuan province to Chengdu, Chongqing, and the 
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border of Sichuan with other provinces respectively.8 Sichuan counties bordering 
other provinces should have experienced any negative level border effects long ago 
and they should now be on their long-run equilibrium growth paths with respect to 
being a border region (and thus their contemporaneous growth rates should no longer 
be negatively affected by being near a provincial border). We measure distance with 
road distance, which is computed using GoogleMap. These distance variables account 
for how proximity to large agglomeration economies and existing borders affect 
growth due to commuting and market access for products (Chen and Partridge, 2013). 
We also include four regional dummy variables in the model. Dum_Minority is a 
dummy indicating whether it is a county receiving minority preferential policies from 
the central government. Dum_CD_District is an indicator variable for whether the 
county (or district) belongs to Chengdu. Dum_County is dummy for rural counties 
that are not urban and Dum_City_District is an indicator variable for whether it is a 
city district. We use these geographic and regional variables to control for the 
possibility that (new) border regions differ systematically from other Sichuan regions, 
not only due to the new border, but also in terms of their distance to large cities and to 
the existing borders, as well as different industrial structures given the varying 
county/district/city types.  
We include 1982 county population in the model as a measure of agglomeration 
economies. We use 1982 population, which is the earliest census data available with 
consistent county boundaries, to avoid potential reverse causality effects of migration 
on population. In addition, we add the interactions between population and the border 
effects dummy to investigate whether border counties with more agglomeration fared 
differently—e.g., more populous border counties may have better avoided population 
decline (Redding and Sturm, 2008).  
The geographical unit we analyze is county (Xian), county-level city (Xian Ji Shi) 
and districts under cities (Shi Xia Qu). We refer to them as county hereafter. Therefore, 
                                                             
8The fixed effects (differenced out) contain the average distance (level) effects, while the distance variable 
coefficients reflect the change in the effects of distance over the period. Thus, the distance results need to be 
interpreted accordingly. The same applies to the other control variable coefficients. 
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we focus on 134 Sichuan counties, including 120 counties, 7 county-level cities, and 7 
city districts.9  
We first use resident population as our dependent variable from the China 
Population Census. Since the population census is conducted by National Statistical 
Bureau (NSB) every 10 years, we use resident population data in 2000 and 2010 to 
compute population growth after 1997 and similarly use population data in 1982 and 
1990 to compute population growth before 1997.10 We also use census population 
data to construct the control variable of agglomeration economies for spatial 
heterogeneity. Given that we have one observation for population growth in the period 
before 1997 and one observation for the period after 1997, we estimate the model 
with OLS.  
We also use the Hukou population as another dependent variable in sensitivity 
analysis. The Hukou population includes those registered (most were born) in that 
county, while resident population includes those who live in that county. Hukou has 
affected the labor market dramatically. Workers without local Hukou have little or no 
access to public welfare provided by local governments and they may also face 
discrimination in the labor market.11 Given the intricacies of the Hukou system, it is 
typically easier to migrate within a province than across provinces. The establishment 
of the new border does not change the Hukou status of those on border counties who 
worked in other regions before 1997. 
The difference between Hukou population and resident population is that resident 
population could originate from anywhere. Conversely, Hukou population accounts 
more for “permanent” residents who could be living and working elsewhere. When 
the Hukou population exceeds the resident population, that suggests that many 
original residents are working/residing elsewhere. The source of the Hukou 
population is from various years of the Sichuan Provincial Year Statistical Yearbook. 
                                                             
9We do not include Sichuan counties whose boundaries changed dramatically during the sample period. 
10NSB conducted the first population census in 1953 and then conducted the census roughly every ten years in 
1964, 1982, 1990, 2000 and 2010. We use the data after 1982 given the data availability with consistent boundaries 
at the county level.  
11See detailed discussions of the Hukou system in Bao et al. (2011) and Song (2014).  
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In this case, because we have annual panel data on population growth, we can 
estimate the model with a fixed-effects approach.  
 
4. Results 
4.1 Baseline  
We define the border (Border50) as comprising all Sichuan counties whose distance to 
the Chongqing border is within 50 kilometers. Our measure is road distance to the 
nearest border crossing to one of Chongqing’s neighbor counties. The 50 kilometer 
dichotomy follows Brülhart et al. (2012) who find that market-access effects decay 
sharply beyond 50 kilometers. A map of these counties is included in Figure 5. 
Figure 5 about here 
The first estimation results are reported in Column (1) of Table 2. The coefficient 
of the interaction term between Border50 and Post1997 is negative and significant at 
the one-percent level. It indicates that in the 10 years after Chongqing was separated 
from Sichuan, population grew 18.5% less in Sichuan border counties than in other 
Sichuan counties (all else equal), relative to their respective pre-1997 growth rates, 
which is somewhat larger than what the simple descriptive statistics indicated in 
section 2. It further supports the hypothesis that the new border reduced market access 
for Sichuan counties close to the border.  
Table 2 about here 
 Regarding the geographic and regional dummy variables, the distance to 
Chongqing is positive and significant while the distance to Chengdu is insignificant. 
These results are suggesting that Chongqing has some “growth shadow” effects that 
implies that being further away from Chongqing favorably affects Sichuan county 
growth, consistent with “backwash” effects found by Chen and Partridge (2013) for 
China’s largest cities. Unlike the distance to the Sichuan-Chongqing border, the 
distance to the Sichuan border for other provinces is insignificant, suggesting that 
during the adjustment phase to the new border, nearby counties lost population, which 
did not apply for Sichuan’s other counties that border other provinces. Among the 
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four regional dummy variables, Minority and Counties belonging to Chengdu are all 
positive and significant, while the other two are insignificant. This is not surprising 
because minority counties and Chengdu counties can have higher population growth 
either because they are in favorable location or because they receive preferential 
treatment from the government.  
 In column (2), we include the log of population in 1982 and its interactions with 
border effects to control for spatial heterogeneity among counties. These results show 
that the main border-effects are still negative and significant. Population is 
insignificant but its interactions with border effects are positive and significant at the 
ten-percent level. The two border effect variables (post 1997) are jointly significant at 
the one-percent level. These results indicate that as Redding and Sturm (2008) found, 
more populated areas fared better with the establishment of the border. Comparing 
columns (2) and (1), the coefficients for the other variables are mainly unchanged. 
 In columns (3) and (4), we include counties with a distance to the border between 
50 and 100 kilometers as an additional treatment variable (Border100) to assess 
whether the (new) border had spillover effects farther away from the border. These 
counties are shown in Figure 5. The results continue to indicate that the interaction of 
Border50 and Post1997 is negative and significant in both of cases, whereas its 
interaction with 1982 population remains positive. Similarly, the interaction between 
Border100 and Post1997 is negative and significant in column (3), but becomes 
insignificant when the Border100 is interacted with 1982 population in column (4). 
However, in column (4), the Border100 term and its interaction with 1982 population 
are jointly significant at the 1% level. Overall, the border effects appear to die out 
somewhere between 50 to 100 kilometers from the new border, though more 
populated border regions fared better. These findings corroborate the distance decay 
of market access and agglomeration effects found in the literature (e.g., Partridge et al., 
2008; Rosenthal and Strange, 2003; Brülhart et al., 2012). 
 Overall, these results suggest that the “new” border set up by the separation of 
Chongqing from Sichuan reduced activity in Sichuan counties near the new border. 
 
 
14 
 
One possible explanation is that the border increases trade and commuting costs of 
these new Sichuan-border counties, reducing their growth, at least until their new 
long-run equilibrium path is attained. Below, we will test the robustness of our 
findings and take a closer look at the border effects to appraise such effects.  
 
4.2 Robustness 
We now conduct a series of robustness checks. Our first consideration is that some 
Sichuan counties such as Pengxi and Daxian have a distance to the Chongqing border 
that is only slightly larger than 50 kilometers. These counties may confound the 
conclusion in the baseline regression that the border effects are confined to 50 
kilometers. Therefore, we redefined these counties as Border50 instead of Border100 
and rerun the regression. However, these results were basically unchanged (not shown 
for brevity). 
We also consider alternative definitions of the control region in Table 3. In 
column (1), we omit counties within 100 kilometers from Chengdu to avoid the 
possible urban influence of Chengdu. Our motivation is that counties close to 
Chengdu may be affected by the strong market access of Chengdu city and including 
these counties in the sample may confound the border effects of interest. In column 
(2), we drop city districts and counties/districts directly belonging to Chengdu. In 
column (3), we exclude counties with a distance within 100 kilometers to Chengdu 
and provincial border counties that are not on the Chongqing border in order to assess 
whether it is an urban effect or an effect related to any other border. In columns 
(4)-(6), we repeat the estimations with these alternative control regions by including 
1982 population and its interactions with the border as additional control variables in 
the model.  
Table 3 about here 
 The estimation results using these control groups are very similar to those 
described in Table 2. The coefficients of interest are not sensitive to the control group 
definitions. The effects of Border50 are negative and significant at the one-percent 
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level in all estimations and the negative effects of Border100 become insignificant 
after the interaction terms between population and the border are included. Likewise, 
the border interaction with 1982 population continues to suggest that more populated 
new-border counties fared better. Thus, our findings that the new Sichuan-Chongqing 
border has negative population effects on counties near the border are generally 
robust.  
 
4.3 Counterfactual Experiments and Falsification Tests  
So far, we defined Sichuan counties located close to the Chongqing border as the 
treated region. Now, we will consider alternative definitions of the treated group as 
counterfactuals or falsification tests. Specifically, we construct a new alternative 
treated group (New BorderMCD) that includes counties that are greater than 100 
kilometers away from (1) Chengdu, (2) the border between Sichuan and Chongqing, 
and (3) the border between Sichuan and any other province. In other words, the 
treated region is a circle band that excludes counties within 100 kilometers to 
Chengdu and/or any Sichuan county that borders any province. These counties are 
shown in Figure 6 and they generally reflect interior rural counties that are 
uninfluenced by a major city. We now consider this treated region to examine whether 
it is really more rural regions that fared poorly after 1997. The estimation results are 
reported in Table 4. 
Figure 6 about here 
Table 4 about here 
 The results in Table 4 are reported in the way as before. We include all the other 
counties as control region in column (1). We exclude city districts and 
counties/districts that belong to Chengdu in column (2). We further drop counties at 
the Chongqing-Sichuan border as well as counties/districts that belong to Chengdu 
and city districts in column (3). In column (4)-(6), we re-estimate the model by adding 
population in 1982 and its interactions with the border.  
The estimation results show that the interactions between New BorderMCD and 
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Post1997 are positive in all specifications (though not always significant) while the 
coefficients of the population interactions become negative and statistically 
significant at the 1-percent level in column (4)-(6). Thus, the main results using the 
alternative treatment groups for Chengdu and for Sichuan’s other provincial border 
counties are exactly the opposite of using the new Sichuan/Chongqing border as the 
treatment. Specifically, counties near Chengdu and Sichuan’s other borders 
experience positive growth post-1997, though the effect is mitigated for urban 
counties. Thus, these results suggest that our previous findings regarding the new 
Sichuan-Chongqing border are not artifacts of the influence of large cities or simple 
provincial border effects experienced on Sichuan’s other provincial borders. 
 
4.4 Other Borders 
To further assess whether we are simply picking up a common border effect for all of 
Sichuan’s provincial borders and not a disequilibrium adjustment on the new 
Chongqing-Sichuan border, all counties at the border between Sichuan and any other 
province are now defined as the treatment region. A map of these counties is included 
in Figure 7. The estimation results are reported in Table 5. 
Figure 7 about here 
Table 5 about here 
As we did in the base regressions, we now include both BorderSC50 (within 50 
kilometers to the border) and BorderSC100 (within 50-100 kilometers to the border) 
in the model. First, column (1) and (5)’s models include all other counties as the 
control region. Second, the models in columns (2) and (6) omit counties which are 
within 100 kilometers from Chengdu. Third, counties/districts belonging to Chengdu 
and city districts are omitted in the models shown in column (3) and (7). Finally, the 
models in columns (4) and (8) omit counties within 100 kilometers to Chengdu and 
those counties at the Chongqing border.   
These results show that there is no indication of negative effects when 
considering all of Sichuan’s borders at once. In fact, most of the coefficients of border 
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effects are positive and even becomes significant at the one-percent level when 
population and its interaction with border effects are controlled. It suggests that unlike 
counties located along the “new” border which have been hurt by the 1997 division, 
counties close to the other existing borders grew faster compared to other Sichuan 
counties since 1997. In all, it seems that borders matter in terms of reducing the levels 
of economic activity, but after there is a new equilibrium, population growth appears 
to returns to its old path. 
 
5. Extensions 
We used resident population above to assess the border effects because our 
agglomeration model predictions relate to current residents. Yet, it is also useful to 
assess whether the new border between Sichuan and Chongqing affects Hukou 
population growth, which may have very different dynamics as they do not have to be 
residents of the place where they have Hukou. Likewise, because a very high share of 
Chinese regional and urban economic studies use Hukou population, it is also useful 
to see if they indicate similar results as using residential population, which is 
generally the subject of related theoretical hypotheses. Since we have annual data on 
Hukou population from 1992 to 2013, we estimate this model with a standard 
fixed-effects panel model. We use population in 1992 to measure initial county size. 
The estimation results are reported in Table 6. 
Table 6 about here 
The results show that most of the border effects are negative, though none of 
them are statistically significant. It suggests that the new Sichuan/Chongqing border 
does not have any significant effects on Hukou population growth in the border region 
compared with other Sichuan regions. Along with the previous result that the 
new-border is inversely related to the number of residents near the border, our finding 
that the border has insignificant effects on the Hukou population suggests that many 
of the original Hukou residents of the new border region left to work elsewhere, in 
which we surmise declining economic opportunities is the cause. In addition, as a 
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further test, when we used the same years and observations as in the base 
first-difference regression (1982-1990 and 2000-2010), the results are robust, 
suggesting that our findings are not an artifact of using a different specification (see 
the Appendix for the results). 
Table 7 about here 
 To further assess our out-migration hypothesis, we next use the ratio of residents 
to Hukou population as the dependent variable and re-estimate the model. In order to 
match the resident population and the baseline regression, we use the ratio only in 
1990 and 2010. We use population in 1982 to measure initial county size. The results 
displayed in Table 7 indicate that there are strong border effects with the ratio. The 
coefficients of border effects within 50 kilometers are negative and significant in all 
the estimations and the border effects beyond 50 kilometers are not significant after 
1982 population is controlled.  
Taken together, these estimation results suggest that the resident/Hukou ratio 
declined in areas closer to the new Chongqing border. As noted above, with the Hukou 
population not being statistically affected by the new border, this suggests that many 
of the residents near the border left after 1997, perhaps to Chengdu, which was 
rapidly growing during the period (and to Chongqing after its growth recovered after 
2004). In all, these extensions support our findings in the baseline regressions that 
there are negative border effects in close proximity to the new border. In addition, 
given the different results for the resident versus Hukou populations, one should be 
cautious in using Hukou population as a proxy for residential population—even 
though Hokou population is more readily available. 
 
6. Conclusions 
The influence of borders on regional and international economic outcomes has 
interested regional and urban economists through its effects on market access when 
there are cross-border transactional costs. Removing a border like the Iron Curtin has 
been shown to increase market access, leading to economic growth (e.g., Redding and 
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Sturm 2008; Brülhart et al., 2012). Yet, to date, there have been no studies of the 
opposite in which a new subnational border is established, where theory generally 
suggests a decline in market access with a resulting decline in population growth.  
 In this study, we consider the 1997 case when a new border was introduced after 
the Chinese province Sichuan was divided into two with a new city-level province 
established for Chongqing. We examine how Sichuan counties near the new border 
with Chongqing fared after the new border was established. Using a 
difference-in-difference approach, we find that “treated” Sichuan counties on the new 
border fared worse than “control” Sichaun counties in the interior (all else equal). 
Descriptive evidence for other border regions on the new Chongqing province also 
showed relative declines in growth rates. These results support the notion that market 
access was reduced for these counties and they indirectly support Poncet (2003, 2005) 
and Xu and Fan’s (2012) findings that Chinese provincial borders create cross-border 
transactional costs associated with border effects.  
 A series of robustness checks were also conducted. We considered whether 
counties on the Sichuan border of other neighboring provinces also experienced 
negative effects, finding that they did not experience the negative effects experienced 
by Sichuan counties on the new border. Likewise, we examined whether we were 
picking up some rural phenomenon in which it was all rural Sichuan counties that 
suffered over the period. Yet, we find that the new border counties also lagged interior 
rural Sichuan counties, supporting our findings that we identified new border effects.  
 The results suggest that the border effects of putting a new border in place 
correspond to the opposite case of removing border—further strengthening the 
validity of the agglomeration and New Economic Geography theories behind the 
influence of market access/potential. In terms of policy, this suggests that 
policymakers should carefully weigh the net costs of creating new borders (or benefits 
of removing borders). Nonetheless, in the case Sichuan/Chongqing case considered in 
this paper, despite the losses experienced on the Sichuan side of the new border, it 
very well could be that gains from a more coherent governance structure on the 
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Chongqing side have (or will) overwhelm the negative effects identified in our study. 
Yet, more research is necessary to determine when changing borders at the regional 
level to encourage centralization or decentralization is beneficial on balance despite 
the potential for adverse border effects.  
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Figure 1: Population Change between 1982 and 1990 in Sichuan Province (%) 
 
Notes: White is for counties whose data are missing due to their boundaries changing during the sample period.   
 
 
Figure 2: Population Change between 2000 and 2010 in Sichuan Province (%) 
 
Notes: White is for counties whose data are missing due to their boundaries changing during the sample period.   
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Figure 3: The Difference of Population Change between 1982-1990 and 
2000-2010 in Sichuan Province (%) 
 
Notes: White is for counties whose data are missing due to their boundaries changing during the sample period. 
 
 
Figure 4: Resident Population of Chongqing and Chengdu (1990-2010), 10,000 
persons 
 
 
Sources: Chongqing Statistical Yearbook 2016 and Chengdu Statistical Yearbook 2016 
Notes: The left y-axis is for Chongqing and right y-axis is for Chengdu. The resident population between 1990 and 
1995 in Chongqing and those between 1990 and 1999 in Chengdu are not available. We used the ratio of resident 
population to Hukou population in 1996 and 2000 to adjust Hukou population to get resident population for the 
two cities respectively. 
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Figure 5: Borders between Sichuan and Chongqing 
 
Notes: Border50 includes counties whose distance to the Sichuan-Chongqing border is under 50 kilometers and 
Border100 are counties whose distance to the border is between 50 and 100 kilometers. We measure distance with 
road distance from the county to the nearest border crossing to one of Chongqing’s neighbor counties. The red line 
is the border between Sichuan and Chongqing. White is for counties whose data are missing due to their 
boundaries changing during the sample period. 
 
Figure 6: Counterfactual Border 
 
Notes: BorderMCD includes counties that are greater than 100 kilometers away from (1) Chengdu, (2) the border 
between Sichuan and Chongqing, and (3) the border between Sichuan and other provinces. We measure distance 
with road distance from the county to the nearest border crossing to one of Chongqing’s neighbor counties. The red 
line is the border between Sichuan and Chongqing. White is for counties whose data are missing due to their 
boundaries changing during the sample period. 
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Figure 7: Borders between Sichuan and Other Provinces  
 
Notes: BorderSC50 includes counties within 50 kilometers to the border between Sichuan and other provinces. 
BorderSC100 includes counties within 50 to 100 kilometers of the border between Sichuan and other provinces. 
Distance is measured as road distance from the county to the nearest border crossing to one of Chongqing’s 
neighbor counties. The red line is the border between Sichuan and Chongqing and the black line is the border 
between Sichuan and other provinces. White is for counties whose data are missing due to their boundaries 
changing during the sample period.  
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Table 1: Resident Population Growth Rate (%) in Counties along the Border 
Border regions 1982-1990 1990-2000 2000-2010 
Sichuana 
Border<=50km 7.94 2.11 -14.62 
50km<Border<=100km 5.46 -1.11 -11.37 
Border>50km 6.79 5.36 2.74 
(Border<=50km) – (Border>50km) 1.15 -3.25 -17.36 
Chongqingb 
Border<=50km 5.47 1.23 -13.39 
50km<Border<=100km 5.78 4.08 -5.58 
Border>50km 6.79 2.27 -6.63 
(Border<=50km) – (Border>50km) -1.32 -1.04 -6.76 
Other 
Provincesc 
Border<=50km 11.96 4.97 -9.00 
50km<Border<=100km 9.08 -1.06 -5.00 
Border>50km 11.20 3.22 -2.54 
(Border<=50km) – (Border>50km) 0.76 1.75 -6.46 
 
Notes: a.Sichuan counties along the border between Sichuan and Chongqing; b.Chongqing counties along the 
border between Chongqing and Sichuan; c.The counties in other provinces neighboring Chongqing (including 
Hubei, Hunan, Guizhou and Shaanxi) along the border between these provinces and Chongqing. 
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Table 2: Baseline Estimations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Border50*Post1997 -18.512*** -57.210*** -19.920*** -58.836*** 
 (2.879) (19.517) (2.935) (20.129) 
Border100*Post1997   -14.191*** -13.366 
   (3.601) (39.527) 
Border50 10.338*** 9.661*** 11.940*** 11.316*** 
 (2.233) (2.316) (2.734) (2.804) 
Border100   8.820*** 8.936*** 
   (2.173) (2.170) 
Post1997 -4.048*** -4.048*** -2.641* -2.641* 
 (1.438) (1.441) (1.529) (1.536) 
Dis_Chongqing 0.023*** 0.016 0.026*** 0.019* 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) 
Dis_Chengdu 0.006 0.011 0.004 0.008 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
Dis_SC_Border 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Dum_Minority 6.948*** 5.935*** 6.938*** 5.905*** 
 (1.805) (1.836) (1.816) (1.860) 
Dum_CD_District 13.866*** 14.600*** 14.139*** 14.901*** 
 (5.030) (5.129) (5.006) (5.115) 
Dum_County -2.747 -1.353 -2.612 -1.199 
 (2.494) (2.585) (2.576) (2.670) 
Dum_City_District 1.844 2.231 1.911 2.316 
 (2.833) (2.998) (2.749) (2.914) 
Border50*Post1997*Pop1982  8.955*  9.006* 
  (4.743)  (4.878) 
Border100*Post1997*Pop1982    -0.190 
    (8.988) 
Pop1982  -1.244  -1.266 
  (1.029)  (1.040) 
Constant -7.861*** -2.120 -8.891*** -3.072 
 (2.798) (5.664) (2.847) (5.717) 
P-Value of F-Test-1  0.000  0.000 
P-Value of F-Test-2    0.001 
No. obs. 268 268 268 268 
R2 0.386 0.367 0.384 0.367 
 
Notes: Border50 defined as counties within 50 kilometers from the Sichuan-Chongqing border. Border100 defined 
as counties between 50-100 kilometers from the border.  
F-Test-1 is the joint significance test of Border50*Post1997 and Border50*Post1997*Pop1982.  
F-Test-2 is the joint significance test of Border100*Post1997 and Border100*Post1997*Pop1982.  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 3: Robustness Tests of Omitting Different Regions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Omit 
<100km to 
Chengdu 
Omit  
City Districts 
& Chengdu 
Counties 
 
Omit 
<100km to 
Chengdu & 
province 
border 
Omit 
<100km to 
Chengdu 
Omit City 
Districts & 
Chengdu 
Counties 
 
Omit 
<100km to 
Chengdu & 
province 
border 
Border50*Post1997 -19.749*** -19.026*** -18.600*** -72.897*** -68.677*** -63.151*** 
 (3.001) (3.012) (3.213) (20.116) (20.489) (21.984) 
Border100*Post1997 -14.021*** -12.281*** -12.872*** -22.545 -29.985 -10.195 
 (3.435) (3.521) (3.613) (37.356) (36.990) (38.595) 
Border50 10.725*** 9.180*** 11.719*** 9.704*** 8.111*** 11.383*** 
 (2.607) (2.614) (3.299) (2.774) (2.749) (3.429) 
Border100 8.674*** 8.225*** 9.681*** 9.114*** 8.352*** 9.834*** 
 (2.136) (2.096) (2.646) (2.165) (2.120) (2.636) 
Post1997 -2.811* -4.169*** -3.961** -2.811* -4.169*** -3.961** 
 (1.465) (1.390) (1.761) (1.463) (1.387) (1.776) 
Border50*Post1997    12.299** 11.582** 10.310* 
*Pop1982    (4.873) (4.965) (5.244) 
Border100*Post1997    1.964 4.105 -0.617 
*Pop1982    (8.439) (8.344) (8.721) 
Pop1982    -2.015* -1.874* -0.106 
    (1.145) (0.982) (1.222) 
Constant -9.750*** -8.256*** -13.148*** -0.894 0.444 -12.717* 
 (3.034) (2.879) (3.869) (5.880) (5.468) (6.607) 
Geography and  
Region Control 
yes yes yes yes yes yes 
P-Value of F-Test-1    0.000 0.000 0.000 
P-Value of F-Test-2    0.000 0.002 0.002 
No. obs. 224 232 168 224 232 168 
R2 0.483 0.486 0.510 0.489 0.492 0.509 
 
Notes: Border50 defined as counties within 50 kilometers from the Sichuan-Chongqing border. Border100 defined 
as counties between 50-100 kilometers from the border. In columns (1) and (4), counties within 100 kilometers 
from Chengdu are dropped; in column (2) and (5), city districts and counties/districts that belong to Chengdu are 
dropped; in columns (3) and (6), counties within 100 kilometers from Chengdu and those at the border between 
Sichuan and other provinces are omitted.  
F-Test-1 is the joint significance test of Border50*Post1997 and Border50*Post1997*Pop1982.  
F-Test-2 is the joint significance test of Border100*Post1997 and Border100*Post1997*Pop1982.  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 4: New Interior Rural Sichuan Treatment Region Falsification Test  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Full 
Sample 
Omit  
City Districts 
& 
Chengdu  
Counties 
Omit  
City 
Districts, 
Chengdu  
Counties, 
and border 
Full 
Sample 
Omit  
City Districts 
& 
Chengdu  
Counties 
Omit  
City 
Districts, 
Chengdu  
Counties, 
and border 
New BorderMCD 3.258 6.206** 3.376 18.031*** 22.036*** 19.686*** 
*Post1997 (2.616) (2.509) (2.634) (4.501) (4.486) (4.562) 
New BorderMCD -1.574 -2.731 -1.506 -0.171 -1.165 -0.098 
 (1.652) (1.673) (1.714) (1.544) (1.530) (1.554) 
Post1997 -7.036*** -9.816*** -6.986*** -7.036*** -9.816*** -6.986*** 
 (1.868) (1.655) (1.833) (1.890) (1.680) (1.854) 
New BorderMCD    -5.551*** -6.091*** -6.276*** 
*Post1997*Pop1982    (1.407) (1.483) (1.450) 
Pop1982    0.540 0.465 -0.082 
    (1.129) (1.067) (1.125) 
Constant -6.402** -4.898 -7.019** -6.990 -4.703 -4.071 
 (2.986) (3.087) (3.098) (6.032) (5.786) (6.018) 
Geo and Region 
Control 
yes yes yes yes yes yes 
P-Value of F-Test    0.000 0.000 0.000 
No. obs. 268 232 206 268 232 206 
R2 0.328 0.435 0.408 0.357 0.482 0.470 
 
Notes: New BorderMCD is defined as counties which are located more than 100 kilometers away from Chengdu 
and/or the Sichuan border with any province. In columns (1) and (4), the control region includes all other 
observations; in columns (2) and (5), city districts and counties/districts that belong to Chengdu are omitted from 
control region; in columns 3 and 6, city districts, counties/districts that belong to Chengdu, and those at the border 
between Chongqing and Sichuan are omitted from the control region.  
F-Test is the joint significance test of New BorderMCD*Post1997 and New BorderMCD*Post1997*Pop1982.  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 5: All Sichuan Provincial Border Counties as Alternative Treatment Group 
 (1) 
Full 
Sample 
(2) 
Omit <100km 
to Chengdu 
(3) 
Omit City 
Districts & 
Chengdu 
Counties 
(4) 
Omit <100km 
to Chengdu & 
Chongqing 
border 
(5) 
Full 
Sample 
(6) 
Omit <100km 
to Chengdu 
(7) 
Omit City 
Districts & 
Chengdu 
Counties 
(8) 
Omit <100km 
to Chengdu & 
Chongqing 
border 
BorderSC50*Post1997 6.815* 8.410** 9.076** 5.587 25.670*** 27.413*** 28.079*** 25.419*** 
 (3.667) (3.634) (3.579) (3.718) (7.363) (7.346) (7.299) (7.237) 
BorderSC100*Post1997 2.416 4.011 3.842 1.964 18.429** 19.366** 19.426** 18.083* 
 (3.513) (3.445) (3.402) (3.532) (8.427) (8.474) (8.574) (9.469) 
BorderSC50 -2.852 -3.978 -3.903 -4.080 -2.278 -3.493 -3.314 -3.988 
 (2.987) (3.074) (3.130) (3.275) (2.881) (2.955) (3.023) (3.094) 
BorderSC100 -5.414* -6.331** -5.354* -6.854** -4.777* -5.746** -4.588* -6.441** 
 (2.786) (2.807) (2.762) (2.932) (2.746) (2.757) (2.681) (2.892) 
Post1997 -7.189*** -8.785*** -9.451*** -5.962*** -7.189*** -8.785*** -9.451*** -5.962*** 
 (1.670) (1.564) (1.478) (1.688) (1.685) (1.585) (1.500) (1.705) 
BorderSC50*Post1997*Pop1982     -7.075*** -7.130*** -7.130*** -7.441*** 
     (2.267) (2.267) (2.255) (2.229) 
BorderSC100*Post1997*Pop1982     -5.358** -5.138** -5.294** -5.551* 
     (2.569) (2.585) (2.660) (2.980) 
Pop1982     -0.400 -0.579 -0.646 -1.435 
     (0.977) (1.068) (0.908) (1.148) 
Constant -5.541* -5.225 -4.725 -5.750 -1.614 -0.371 0.278 2.892 
 (3.291) (3.636) (3.448) (3.927) (5.309) (5.447) (5.120) (5.867) 
Geography and Region Control yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
P-Value of F-Test-1     0.003 0.001 0.001 0.002 
P-Value of F-Test-2     0.092 0.072 0.076 0.161 
No. obs. 268 224 232 196 268 224 232 196 
R2 0.339 0.430 0.444 0.415 0.364 0.466 0.481 0.466 
Notes: BorderSC50 defined as counties within 50 kilometers from the border between Sichuan and other provinces (excluding Chongqing). BorderSC100 defined as counties within 50-100 
kilometers from the same border. In columns 1 and 4, all observations are included; in column 2 and 5, counties within 100 kilometers from Chengdu are omitted from the control region; in 
columns 3 and 6, city districts and counties/districts that belong to Chengdu are dropped; in column 4 and 8, counties within 100 kilometers away from Chengdu and those at the border 
between Sichuan and Chongqing are omitted.  
F-Test-1 is the joint significance test of BorderSC50*Post1997 and BorderSC50*Post1997*Pop1982.  
F-Test-2 is the joint significance test of BorderSC100*Post1997 and BorderSC100*Post1997*Pop1982.  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 6: Panel Models Using Hukou Population  
 (1) 
Full 
Sample 
(2) 
Omit <100km 
to Chengdu 
(3) 
Omit City 
Districts & 
Chengdu 
Counties  
(4) 
Omit <100km 
to Chengdu & 
province border 
(5) 
Full 
Sample 
(6) 
Omit <100km 
to Chengdu 
(7) 
Omit City 
Districts & 
Chengdu 
Counties  
(8) 
Omit <100km 
to Chengdu & 
province border 
Border50*Post1997 0.100 0.025 0.067 0.002 -0.291 -0.366 -0.324 -0.389 
 (0.141) (0.170) (0.163) (0.125) (0.435) (0.446) (0.443) (0.432) 
Border100*Post1997 -0.133 -0.208 -0.166 -0.231 2.387 2.312 2.354 2.289 
 (0.236) (0.254) (0.250) (0.227) (3.276) (3.282) (3.281) (3.291) 
Border50*Post1997*Pop1992     0.089 0.089 0.089 0.089 
     (0.093) (0.094) (0.094) (0.094) 
Border100*Post1997*Pop1992     -0.573 -0.573 -0.573 -0.573 
     (0.728) (0.729) (0.729) (0.732) 
Constant 0.830** 0.840** 0.838** 0.418*** 0.830** 0.840** 0.838** 0.418*** 
 (0.320) (0.382) (0.369) (0.097) (0.320) (0.383) (0.369) (0.097) 
Year and county fixed effects  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
No. obs 2814 2352 2436 1764 2814 2352 2436 1764 
R2 0.035 0.041 0.040 0.078 0.034 0.040 0.039 0.077 
Notes: Border50 defined as counties within 50 kilometers from the Sichuan-Chongqing border. Border100 defined as counties between 50-100 kilometers from the border. In columns (1) and 
(5), all counties are included in the sample. In columns (2) and (6), counties within 100 kilometers from Chengdu are omitted from the control region; in columns (3) and (7), city districts and 
counties/districts that belong to Chengdu are omitted; in columns (4) and (8), counties within 100 kilometers from Chengdu and those at the border between Sichuan and other provinces are 
omitted.  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 7: Estimation of the Ratio of Residents to Hukou Population  
 (1) 
Full 
Sample 
(2) 
Omit <100km 
to Chengdu 
(3) 
Omit City 
Districts & 
Chengdu 
Counties 
(4) 
Omit <100km 
to Chengdu & 
province border 
(5) 
Full 
Sample 
(6) 
Omit <100km 
to Chengdu 
(7) 
Omit City 
Districts & 
Chengdu 
Counties  
(8) 
Omit <100km 
to Chengdu & 
province border 
Border50*Post1997 -0.167*** -0.157*** -0.157*** -0.154*** -0.388** -0.370** -0.412** -0.350* 
 (0.023) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.181) (0.169) (0.174) (0.192) 
Border100*Post1997 -0.102*** -0.092*** -0.074** -0.089*** -0.159 -0.135 -0.326 -0.082 
 (0.031) (0.029) (0.029) (0.031) (0.349) (0.340) (0.325) (0.363) 
Border50 0.053** 0.043** 0.034* 0.066*** 0.042* 0.033** 0.018 0.076*** 
 (0.022) (0.017) (0.020) (0.020) (0.023) (0.016) (0.023) (0.029) 
Border100 0.037** 0.024* 0.029** 0.047*** 0.039** 0.029** 0.030** 0.065*** 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.018) 
Post1997 -0.074*** -0.084*** -0.094*** -0.088*** -0.074*** -0.084*** -0.094*** -0.073*** 
 (0.015) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.015) (0.012) (0.014) (0.019) 
Border50*Post1997*Pop1982     0.051 0.049 0.059 0.042 
     (0.044) (0.040) (0.042) (0.047) 
Border100*Post1997*Pop1982     0.013 0.010 0.059 -0.005 
     (0.081) (0.078) (0.075) (0.085) 
Pop1982     -0.033** -0.025** -0.036** -0.028 
     (0.015) (0.011) (0.016) (0.019) 
Constant 0.888*** 0.913*** 0.892*** 0.850*** 1.039*** 1.025*** 1.061*** 0.960*** 
 (0.033) (0.029) (0.033) (0.027) (0.063) (0.052) (0.066) (0.084) 
Geography and Region Control yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
P-Value of F-Test-1     0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
P-Value of F-Test-2     0.004 0.007 0.034 0.010 
No. obs 268 224 232 168 268 224 232 212 
R2 0.353 0.538 0.450 0.635 0.367 0.549 0.475 0.386 
Notes: Border50 defined as counties within 50 kilometers from the Sichuan-Chongqing border. Border100 defined as counties between 50-100 kilometers from the border. In columns (1) and 
(5), all counties are included in the sample. In columns (2) and (6), counties within 100 kilometers from Chengdu are dropped from the control region; in columns (3) and (7), city districts and 
counties/districts that belong to Chengdu are omitted; in columns (4) and (8), counties within 100 kilometers from Chengdu and those at the border between Sichuan and other provinces are 
omitted.  
F-Test-1 is the joint significance test of Border50*Post1997and Border50*Post1997*Pop1982.  
F-Test-2 is the joint significance test of Border100*Post1997 and Border100*Post1997*Pop1982.  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Appendix: OLS Estimation of Hukou Population  
 (1) 
Full 
Sample 
(2) 
Omit <100km 
to Chengdu 
(3) 
Omit City 
Districts & 
Chengdu 
Counties 
(4) 
Omit <100km 
to Chengdu & 
province border 
(5) 
Full 
Sample 
(6) 
Omit <100km 
to Chengdu 
(7) 
Omit City 
Districts & 
Chengdu 
Counties  
(8) 
Omit <100km 
to Chengdu & 
province border 
Border50*Post1997 -5.588*** -7.299*** -5.776*** -6.198*** -13.189 -20.685** -20.631** -12.184 
 (1.672) (1.876) (1.809) (2.141) (8.444) (9.496) (9.586) (10.214) 
Border100*Post1997 -8.809*** -10.520*** -9.818*** -9.420*** -12.673 -18.948** -14.730 -11.039 
 (1.686) (1.833) (1.799) (2.054) (9.170) (9.203) (9.052) (10.181) 
Border50 8.177*** 8.691*** 7.063*** 7.518** 8.345*** 8.749*** 7.119*** 8.238*** 
 (2.272) (2.395) (2.333) (3.062) (2.307) (2.441) (2.367) (3.111) 
Border100 6.981*** 8.125*** 7.134*** 7.101*** 6.920*** 8.076*** 7.151*** 6.990*** 
 (1.843) (1.955) (1.932) (2.321) (1.839) (1.957) (1.943) (2.226) 
Post1997 4.185*** 5.895*** 4.716*** 4.795*** 4.185*** 5.895*** 4.716*** 4.795*** 
 (1.122) (1.315) (1.225) (1.582) (1.126) (1.322) (1.232) (1.573) 
Border50*Post1997*Pop1982     1.759 3.098 3.465 1.385 
     (1.977) (2.214) (2.249) (2.387) 
Border100*Post1997*Pop1982     0.890 1.942 1.139 0.373 
     (2.190) (2.204) (2.183) (2.462) 
Pop1982     0.766 0.538 0.413 2.227** 
     (0.788) (0.931) (0.771) (1.098) 
Constant -1.032 -2.908 -0.877 -0.871 -4.584 -5.264 -2.816 -11.504* 
 (2.907) (3.097) (2.985) (3.376) (4.588) (4.919) (4.485) (6.737) 
Geography and Region Control yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
P-Value of F-Test-1     0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 
P-Value of F-Test-2     0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
No. obs 268 224 232 168 268 224 232 168 
R2 0.243 0.285 0.274 0.231 0.238 0.278 0.267 0.240 
Notes: Border50 defined as counties within 50 kilometers from the Sichuan-Chongqing border. Border100 defined as counties between 50-100 kilometers from the border. In columns (1) and 
(5), all counties are included in the sample. In columns (2) and (6), counties within 100 kilometers from Chengdu are dropped from the control region; in columns (3) and (7), city districts and 
counties/districts that belong to Chengdu are omitted; in columns (4) and (8), counties within 100 kilometers from Chengdu and those at the border between Sichuan and other provinces are 
omitted.  
F-Test-1 is the joint significance test of Border50*Post1997and Border50*Post1997*Pop1982.  
F-Test-2 is the joint significance test of Border100*Post1997 and Border100*Post1997*Pop1982.  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
